At the frontier of practical political economy : operationalizing an agent-based stakeholder model in the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific Region by Nunberg, Barbara et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5176
At the Frontier of Practical 
Political Economy
Operationalizing an Agent-Based Stakeholder Model 







East Asia and Pacific Region


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5176
Reform programs sometimes falter because they are 
politically infeasible. Policy change inevitably creates 
winners and losers, so those with vested interests strike 
bargains to determine how far and how quickly reform 
should advance. Understanding these micro political 
dynamics of reform can mean the difference between a 
successful intervention that gains political traction and 
a well-intentioned gambit that falls short of achieving 
its developmental objectives. Donors like the World 
Bank have been searching for ways to take these political 
factors more fully into account as they design programs 
to support country reforms. 
This initiative sought to introduce a rigorous and 
operationally usable political analysis tool that could 
be systematically integrated into the World Bank’s 
country programming cycle. The East Asia and Pacific 
region carried out a multi-country pilot of the Agent-
Based Stakeholder Model. This innovative analytical 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to conduct and disseminate operationally focused political economy research. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at bn2144@columbia.edu and nbarma@worldbank.org. 
approach entails a quantitative simulation of the 
complex bargaining dynamics surrounding reform. The 
model anticipates stakeholder coalition formation and 
gauges the political feasibility of alternative proposed 
interventions. This paper provides a review of the Agent-
Based Stakeholder Model pilot experience, exploring 
what sets this model apart from more traditional 
approaches, how it works, and how it fits into the Bank’s 
operational cycle at various stages. An overview of the 
Mongolia, Philippines, and Timor-Leste country cases 
is followed by an examination of policy-related insights 
and lessons learned. Finally, the paper builds on this East 
Asian pilot experience, offering ideas on a potential way 
forward for organizations like the World Bank to deepen 
and extend their political analysis capabilities. The paper 
argues that the Agent-Based Stakeholder Model, utilized 
thoughtfully, offers a powerful addition to the practical 
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 At the Frontier of Practical Political Economy: 
Operationalizing an Agent-Based Stakeholder Model in the World Bank’s 
East Asia and Pacific Region 
 
Reform programs sometimes falter because they are politically infeasible. Policy change inevitably 
creates winners and losers, so those with vested interests strike bargains to determine how far and 
how quickly reform should advance. These are the micro political dynamics of reform; 
understanding them can mean the difference between a successful intervention that gains political 
traction and a well-intentioned gambit that falls short of achieving its developmental objectives.  
 
Donors like the World Bank have been searching for ways to take these political factors more fully 
into account as they design programs to support country reforms.
1 Recent reviews of the Bank’s 
development effectiveness have all concluded that more attention to the political economy of 
reform is needed.
2 Where political analysis has been undertaken, it has only rarely fed directly into 
the development of country assistance strategies or permeated the details of program design and 
implementation. Some political economy approaches were analytically sound but lacked practical 
applications. Others offered practical solutions that were not grounded in analytical rigor. 
 
This initiative therefore sought to introduce a rigorous and operationally usable political analysis tool 
that could be systematically integrated into the World Bank’s country programming cycle. The East 
Asia and Pacific region (EAP) carried out a multi-country pilot of the Agent-Based Stakeholder 
Model (ABSM). This innovative analytical approach entails a quantitative simulation of the complex 
bargaining dynamics surrounding reform. The model anticipates stakeholder coalition formation and 
gauges the political feasibility of alternative proposed interventions. This paper provides a review of 
the ABSM pilot experience, exploring what sets this model apart from more traditional approaches, 
how it works, and how it fits into the Bank’s operational cycle at various stages. An overview of the 
Mongolia, Philippines, and Timor-Leste country cases is followed by an examination of policy-
related insights and lessons learned.
3 Finally, the paper builds on this East Asian pilot experience, 
offering ideas on a potential way forward for organizations like the World Bank to deepen and 
extend their political analysis capabilities.  
 
 
I—Moving Beyond Traditional Approaches to Political Analysis 
 
Until recently, the World Bank’s political analysis toolbox has relied primarily on relatively blunt-
edged instruments pitched at understanding the macro political landscape in client countries. Such 
analytical instruments—which have included, over time, Institutional and Governance Reviews 
                                                 
1 See, inter alia, Keefer, Philip (2006) “Can political economy analysis make a difference for development policy?” 
Unpublished draft; Fritz, Verena, Kai Kaiser, and Brian Levy (2009) Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy 
Analysis: A Good Practice Framework. Washington DC: World Bank. 
2 See, for example, World Bank (2005) Improving the World Bank’s Development Effectiveness: What Does Evaluation Show? 
Operations Evaluation Department (now the Independent Evaluation Group). Washington DC: World Bank; World 
Bank (2006) Engaging in Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress. 
Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank; World Bank (2008) Public Sector Reform: What Works and 
Why? An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Support. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington DC: World Bank. 
3Extensive analytical work applying the ABSM was conducted in a fourth country. For reasons of political sensitivity in a 
volatile environment, a decision was taken not to discuss the case in this paper. Observations emerging from the case on 
the general utility of the ABSM approach are, however, included implicitly in the discussion. 2 
 
(IGRs), Poverty and Social Impact Analyses (PSIAs), and Country Governance and Anticorruption 
(CGAC) Assessments
4—can provide informative context on the policy landscape and a broad 
understanding of the political drivers of key policy reforms. The forms of qualitative stakeholder 
analysis that frequently underpin these approaches have mapped the behavior of interested actors at 
a single point in time in response to reform initiatives. But these qualitative approaches tend to be 
subjective and static, and they are inevitably overwhelmed by highly complex reform environments 
with large numbers of relevant stakeholders. These conventional instruments are easy to use but 
they do not exploit the rigor of cutting-edge political science methods now available to analyze how 
coalition dynamics affect the political prospects of specific interventions.  
 
The Agent-Based Stakeholder Model (ABSM) moves beyond these traditional approaches to apply 
advanced political science techniques to stakeholder analysis. It offers a robust way to inject just-in-
time realism into the design of Bank operations, helping guide the reform support strategy toward 
achievable goals or, where appropriate, signaling when to jettison programs that are going nowhere 
politically. The ABSM was introduced in EAP in an experiment to elevate the sophistication, 
accuracy, and operational relevance of political analysis at the Bank. The model draws on leading-
edge work in microeconomics and rational choice theory to analyze the preferences and behaviors 
of relevant decision makers on politically driven issues. The ABSM algorithm simulates the complex 
round-by-round bargaining dynamics among a large number of stakeholders in a given reform 
process. The model anticipates how these dynamics play out over time and provides an empirical 
assessment of the likely extent of reform and degree of stakeholder support for this outcome. While 
not a substitute for comprehensive understanding of a country’s political economy, the ABSM can 
add considerable value to other types of analysis (Table 1). 
 
Table 1:  ABSM Adds Value to Other Common Political Analysis Tools 
 










What is it?  Talking informally 
with clients and 
local observers 
about political 
trends and events 
Understanding broad 
political drivers of key 
policy reforms 
Static stakeholder 
mapping based on 
informed opinion 
Quantitative simulation of 
complex political bargaining 
dynamics that predicts 
stakeholder behavior in real 
time 
Why do 
we do it? 
Offers a quick take 
on the political 
landscape to help 
Bank country teams 
in daily client 
interactions 
Contextualizes policy 
issues in political 
reality; sheds light on 
multiple factors behind 
complex problems 
Provides a broad 
snapshot of where 
stakeholders stand 
on a key policy 
issue 
Provides a rigorous 
understanding of complex 
stakeholder coalitions and a 
gauge of the political feasibility 





To garner initial 
views on political 
events and identify 
potential reform 
allies 
To inform country and 
sector strategy 
upstream and reassess 
program 
implementation in light 
of political change 
To gain an initial 
sense of coalitions 
supporting and 
opposing reform 
and the degree of 
consensus  
To identify fruitful entry points 
for reform, build consensus, 
and manage risks through 
explicit testing of alternate 
strategies 
                                                 
4 Levy, Brian, and Nick Manning (2002) Institutional and Governance Reviews – a new type of economic and sector work. PREM 
Note No. 75. Washington DC: World Bank; World Bank (2007) Tools for Institutional, Political, and Social Analysis of Policy 
Reform: A Sourcebook for Development Practitioners. Washington DC: World Bank. 3 
 
II—How the Model Works 
 
At its heart, the ABSM simulates the bargaining dynamics among individual stakeholders with regard 
to a specific policy reform. It builds on three theories in microeconomics and rational choice.
5 The 
median voter theorem identifies the political center of gravity at the median position on a reform 
spectrum; hence the winning reform coalition is at the position of the median stakeholder. 
According to risk theory, stakeholders who are close to this median outcome are assumed to be risk 
averse, unwilling to risk political capital by insisting on their original position at the possible expense 
of not reaching a deal; on the other hand, stakeholders who are far away from the median outcome 
are more likely to risk holding up consensus in hopes of achieving what they want (Figure 1). Using 
game theory, the ABSM simulates how, subject to these risk tradeoffs, each stakeholder attempts to 
achieve his preferred reform outcome. In sum, the algorithm models the interactions between each 
pair of stakeholders over a number of dynamic rounds and predicts the likely outcome of these 
iterated interactions.  
 




The ABSM approach uses a thorough data collection and recording process to translate the 
qualitative political economy knowledge of country and technical experts into a single dataset, which 
feeds into a dynamic quantitative analysis of stakeholder bargaining on a particular reform issue. The 
model predicts the specific outcome of a reform process based on stakeholder preferences. Through 
real-time scenario analysis, the analyst can then test the potential impact of alternative interventions. 
This process can inform the detailed strategic decisions needed to design and implement reforms.  
 
                                                 
5 On the median voter theorem, see Black, Duncan (1948) “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making,” Journal of 
Political Economy Vol. 56: 23-24; and Black, Duncan (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. On risk theory, see Pratt, John W. (1964) “Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large,” Econometrica Vol. 
32: 122-36; and Arrow, Kenneth J. (1971) Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Chicago: Markham. On game theory, see 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1980) “An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 
Vol. 74(4): 917-31; and Lalman, David (1988) “Conflict Resolution and Peace,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 
32(3): 590-615.  
For a more detailed explication of the theoretical underpinnings of the ABSM and how these various theories are 
merged in its underlying algorithm, see Abdollahian, Mark, and Jacek Kugler. “An Agent Based Stakeholder Model of 
Politics.” Unpublished technical paper; and Abdollahian, Mark, Michael Baranick, Brian Efird, and Jacek Kugler (2006) 
"Senturion: A Predictive Political Simulation Model," Defense & Technology No. 32. Washington DC: National Defense 
University. 4 
 
As it has been operationalized during the course of the EAP pilot, agent-based stakeholder analysis 
is carried out in five steps:
6  
 
1. Framing the question: The framing step involves articulating the overall objective of the 
political problem and breaking it down into its component parts for detailed analysis. The 
organizational logic of the ABSM provides a structured format to focus general discussions of 
strategy and policy into concrete issues for analysis. As such, the framing step can help discipline 
conceptualization of the policy puzzle within the broader political economy landscape. 
 
2. Specifying the issue: An “issue,” for the purposes of the ABSM, is defined as the continuum of 
options that stakeholders may support on a specific policy matter. An issue is specified in a linear 
manner from 0 to 100, either from the least politically difficult reform being considered to the most 
politically difficult (Figure 2), or in terms of two alternative poles of reform. In either case, 
intermediate reform steps are identified along the spectrum.  
 
Figure 2:  Issue Continuum – The Range of Negotiated Policy Outcomes 
 
 
Issue specification is probably the most challenging aspect of applying the ABSM to the Bank’s 
policy dialogue and operational programs; this step is where substantive expertise and the “art” of 
analytical creativity are most crucial. Taking time to specify the issue properly is also one of the 
model’s benefits, as it helps the Bank achieve clarity on the reform issue, desired outcomes, and key 
stakeholders. 
 
3. Collecting data: Modeling the policy dynamics behind a specific issue proceeds with a rigorous 
data collection process. Structured interviews are conducted with individuals who possess a rich 
understanding of the country context, the stakeholder landscape, and/or the policy issue being 
analyzed. The information gathered during these interviews is coded numerically for entry into the 
ABSM software. The aim is to obtain the following data for each specified issue: 
 
  Stakeholders: A list of all individuals or groups who could potentially influence the outcome of 
reform. This list comprises government counterparts, other country officials and political parties, 
World Bank departments, the donor community, and private sector and civil society groups 
(including academics and the media as well as international and local non-governmental 
organizations) with an interest in the reform outcome. 
  Positions: The extent of reform supported by each stakeholder, according to the issue spectrum 
defined. Each position is assigned a numerical value on the issue continuum (from 0 to 100) and 
can be pinpointed in relation to all other stakeholders’ positions. Position data elicit not the 
outcome the expert thinks each stakeholder would eventually accept (reservation price), nor the 
stakeholder’s true beliefs (revealed preference), but the policy position each stakeholder is 
currently advocating given the political environment. 
  Influence: The potential influence, power, or resources that each stakeholder could credibly 
bring to bear on the issue. Each influence score is defined as a numerical value (from 0 to 100) 
relative to all other stakeholders’ influence scores. 
                                                 
6 Below, each of these steps is revisited in terms of the analytical value of the ABSM process itself. 
 
0 = Minimum Advocated Position  Maximum Advocated Position = 1005 
 
  Salience: The importance of the issue to the stakeholder. Each salience score is defined as a 
numerical value (from 0 to 100) that captures how much time and energy a stakeholder is willing 
to devote to the issue, given all the other issues the stakeholder is concerned with. 
 
Collecting data to apply the ABSM to Bank policy questions is an iterative process. For each issue, 
initial data are collected from key members of the Bank’s country team and technical experts. 
Interviews are then conducted with external experts who have been identified by Bank staff, and the 
issue specification and data are amended accordingly.
7 Iteration allows data to be cross-checked to 
ensure that the model is run on the basis of accurate information.  
 
4. Analyzing the basecase: The data described above are entered into the ABSM and its bargaining 
algorithm generates a picture of expected stakeholder interactions over time given current 
stakeholder positions and perceptions. This is the model’s “basecase” outcome (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3:  ABSM Basecase Analysis8 
 
 
                                                 
7 In countries where confidentiality is critical, data collection can be restricted to a select set of trusted external experts, 
counterparts, and donors upon whose discretion the Bank can rely. This issue is discussed further below. 




















Analysis begins with a careful and detailed examination of the graphical display of basecase results to 
determine whether stakeholders are expected to converge in support of a particular reform position, 
to what degree, and how quickly; and, therefore, what level of reform could be expected under the 
current dialogue and with what level of support. The ABSM is then used to drill down into the 
details of the underlying bargaining dynamics to see how the basecase outcome evolves. This allows 
analysts to identify which stakeholders are expected to change position and in response to whom 
(Figure 4), opportunities the Bank may have to work with key stakeholders to build consensus and 
advance reform, and potential obstacles the Bank faces in achieving its desired level of reform.   
 




5. Defining and interpreting alternative scenarios: Based on the analysis of the basecase 
expected outcome, the ABSM is used to run simulations of strategies the Bank (or other actors) 
might be able to use to improve reform outcomes.
9 This exercise explicitly tests whether taking a 
different policy position could, for example, help the Bank achieve greater consensus in support of 
reform, or if the Bank could realistically exert leverage on a particular stakeholder to garner support 
for more extensive policy change. The model can thus provide a detailed illustration of the micro-
politics surrounding the implementation of reforms, and the costs and rewards of alternative Bank 
strategies. The model also offers sensitivity analysis to determine whether changes in position, 
salience, or influence scores for certain stakeholders could have a significant impact on the outcome. 
Sophisticated statistical randomization techniques (such as Monte Carlo simulations) are also 
available to help minimize bias from inaccurate data.
10 
 
The ABSM is captured in a user-friendly software application that can easily be loaded onto a laptop, 
offering intuitive visual snapshots of data and analysis and the flexibility to refine issue specification 
and data input on the go. Staff with a background in political science or institutional economics can 
be trained on the model’s methodology, analytical techniques, and practical application during a 
                                                 
9 “Improvement” is a relative term depending on how each stakeholder views the prospect of reform. Here, we refer to 
policy improvements from the point of view of the Bank team conducting the stakeholder analysis. 
10 See Abdollahian et al and Abdollahian and Kugler, op. cit., for more details on these techniques. 7 
 
three-day hands-on course. Members of country or task teams can thus use this portable tool 
themselves, on demand, helping to embed political analysis in operational decision making so as to 
have impact on real-time policy choices. 
 
 
III—What the Model Can Do: Country Case Studies 
 
The East Asia and Pacific region piloted the ABSM approach in four countries, attempting to 
integrate the model into the analytical and project cycle and thereby generate lessons on the model’s 
applicability to Bank work.
11 The overall aim of this exercise was to improve the quality of political 
analysis informing strategic programming choices and to enable the Bank to work with country 
counterparts to build consensus for important governance reforms. The model was applied, on 
demand, at various stages of the operational cycle (Table 2).  
 
Table 2:  Five Pilots at Four Stages of the Bank’s Operational Cycle 
 









 Targeted insights on the scope and contours of political will to 
assess momentum behind a multi-faceted reform program 
 “Blue sky” exploration of potential new areas of Bank 
engagement 
 Helps identify key supporters and opponents, along with Bank 
strategies to actively build political commitment by bolstering 
supportive coalitions and defusing potential opposition 
 Sensitivity testing can be used to examine which strategies are 
robust across different possible states of political affairs, helping 
anticipate “political landmines” 
Timor-Leste: Entry 














 Assessing nature of political commitment to core reform goals 
analyzed in a public expenditure review or other core diagnostic 
 Helps identify key supporters and opponents of reform 
 Insights into the links between micro reform issues and macro-
political context 
Mongolia: Options in 
natural resource 






 Defining politically feasible prior actions for policy loans 
 Allocating resources efficiently to most promising reform 
prospects 
 Helps identify specific opportunities for reform and develop risk 
mitigation strategies to avoid potential derailment of an operation 
 Helps build consensus for reform 
Calibrating 
conditionality or prior 
actions for a broad-
based policy operation 




 Identifying opportunities for and threats to achieving project 
objectives 
 Developing risk mitigation strategies  
 Building consensus for reform and bolstering engagement 
Philippines: Risk 
mitigation for NPSTAR 
project 
                                                 
11 This work was supported by a Bank Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP) grant on “Building Capacity for 
Political Stakeholder Analysis.” Earlier work using a beta version of the model paved the way for this more extensive 
pilot. 8 
 
In Timor-Leste, the ABSM explored the Bank’s potential role in supporting new momentum behind 
a civil service reform program ahead of the next Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The Mongolia 
country team applied the model twice, first to evaluate options for strengthening transparency and 
accountability in the public sector and then, in the context of the Country Governance and 
Anticorruption (CGAC) Assessment, to inform analytical work to support the transparent and 
effective use of mining revenues. In the Philippines, the Bank employed the ABSM to guide 
implementation of a stalled tax administration reform project, seeking to avoid the pitfalls 
encountered in previous attempts to improve the tax system. Extensive analytical work applying the 
ABSM was conducted in a fourth country to help assess political commitment to a broad-based 
development policy operation and to help define realistic reform targets in a difficult environment.  
 
The ABSM pilot experience is reviewed briefly below, highlighting one of the modeled issues in 
three countries to explore why the context was ripe for systematic political analysis, what we learned, 
how we changed our approach, and—where sufficient time has passed—what has happened since.
12  
 
Upstream Strategy Development: Entry Points for Civil Service Reform in Timor-Leste 
 
Administrative and civil service reform recently resurfaced as a pivotal issue in Timor-Leste. The 
fragile coalition government that came to power after the 2006 political crisis declared 2008 to be 
the “Year of Administrative Reform,” pledging to restore public confidence in government by 
strengthening the institutional framework for accountability and service delivery. The Prime Minister 
personally took the lead in driving several key initiatives, chief among them the proposed 
establishment of a Civil Service Commission with wide-ranging powers. 
 
To date, the Bank has not been a lead player on administrative and civil service reform in Timor-
Leste but it has been at the forefront of other public sector reform initiatives. In 2006, in concert 
with other development partners, the Bank launched the Planning and Financial Management 
Capacity Building Program (PFMCBP) to help tackle serious deficiencies in public spending and 
revenue management. After a slow start, the program was reshaped in 2008 to help the new Ministry 
of Finance manage crucial public financial management priorities while planning for longer-term 
professional development needs. The Ministry wanted to reorganize public financial management 
processes and develop the supporting system of incentives, rewards, and sanctions to build a 
stronger public service ethos. The Bank agreed to support the Ministry’s objectives and, in addition, 
made a commitment during the 2008 Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting to support 
the country’s administrative reform process more broadly.  
 
The ABSM was enlisted to help better understand the political dynamics operating beneath the 
surface of this complex agenda and to identify the most promising entry points for potential 
intervention. The analytical exercise focused on three dimensions of civil service reform: (1) the 
potential creation of a Civil Service Commission and its appropriate scope of powers; (2) the 
demand for a revised pay and grading system and the underlying debate between job- and 
                                                 
12 Exhaustive country case studies are available upon request. These provide extensive detail on each of the three to five 
issues modeled in each country, including: (1) a full dataset listing all stakeholders included in the analysis along with 
their position, influence, and salience data; (2) the ABSM modeling outcomes; and (3) a list of all experts interviewed 
during the course of the analysis. Each country pilot was also evaluated systematically through the application of a 
standardized assessment framework comparing ex ante expectations with the ABSM’s impact over time; a synopsis of this 
evaluation is provided below. 9 
 
qualification-based systems; and (3) the more general discussion about what would constitute a 
robust program of civil service reform and the level of political appetite for its implementation. 
Following is a brief review of the ABSM analysis on the third issue, the broader civil service reform 
agenda. 
 
Framing the question. Although the Government of Timor-Leste had articulated its commitment 
to improving public administration and service delivery, comprehensive civil service reform can be 
difficult to achieve anywhere. Well-intentioned reforms can easily be derailed by weak capacity, 
overlapping and ill-defined policies, feeble coordination across ministries and agencies, a fragile 
political coalition, and stakeholders’ worries about what might happen to their own pay levels, 
positions, and recruitment and promotion opportunities. The ABSM analysis focused on the 
potential scope of support for wide-ranging reform and attempted to identify the major coalitions 
that might form on this issue. In Timor-Leste’s social and political order—characterized by political 
schisms and corresponding patronage networks borne of a violent struggle for independence—
merit-oriented civil service reforms were highly contentious. Given the country’s need to elevate 
government performance to achieve tangible results on service delivery as a means to political 
stability, the stakes were particularly high. 
 
Specifying the issue. The process of arraying the varied elements of a comprehensive civil service 
reform package along a linear continuum proved complicated. The team divided the overall agenda 
into three levels of cumulative reform, building from 0 to 100 (Figure 5).  
 


















The first level focused on the low-hanging fruit: temporary pay relief, pay and grading pilots, and 
technical analysis. The second level covered the design of a new system: approving a new framework 
for civil service management, creating a senior executive cadre, and defining the legal basis for 
institutional mandates regarding the civil service. The last—and most politically difficult—level 
0 – Status quo 
5 – Provisional pay & grading package approved in decree law
10 – Pay & grading pilots initiated 
30 – Technical analysis, including job evaluation & comparative pay
40 – Civil service management framework approved
45 – Senior executive cadre defined, recruited, & adequately resourced
55 – Legislative basis for civil service institutional responsibilities
75 – Govt-wide pay & grading system implemented & adequately resourced 
80 – Robust establishment management system implemented & resourced 
95 – Merit-based civil service regime implemented
100 – Independent oversight of merit-based civil service regime 10 
 
focused on the actual implementation of reforms: a new government-wide pay and grading system, 
establishment control, merit-based practices, and independent oversight.
13  
 
Collecting data. The team met with a total of thirty experts in Timor-Leste, gathering information 
through broad, contextual interviews as well as more structured data interviews. The data showed 
that key executive stakeholders supported basic reforms up to and including the definition of a legal 
basis for institutional oversight of the civil service. A few interested groups within the executive 
advocated a higher degree of reform, including changes to the pay and grading system, while most 
civil servant groups favored more moderate steps. Lower-level civil servants, temporary workers, 
and political opposition groups were resistant to anything but basic technical analysis. Within the 
Bank, the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) department supported the most 
comprehensive level of reform, while the country team called for more gradual progress toward the 
definition of a senior executive cadre. The initial landscape of stakeholder positions is laid out in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6:  Initial Stakeholder Positions on Timor-Leste’s Civil Service Reform Agenda 
 
 
Analyzing the basecase. Based on initial stakeholder positions and perceptions, the model 
anticipated some level of consensus on setting up the formal arrangements for civil service 
management, including outlining the framework for civil service management and creating a senior 
executive cadre (Figure 7). Key groups—including civil servants, the executive branch, and political 
parties—would for the most part be included in this consensus. A sizeable block of stakeholders 
would support greater reform, advocating legislation on institutional responsibilities and moving 
toward implementation of reforms. But the model did not foresee much political support for 
implementation of more comprehensive reforms during the timeframe covered by the analysis 
(generally about two years); only a handful of executive stakeholders, donors, and governance-





                                                 
13 As with all issues specified for ABSM, support for the highest level of reform would include support for the 






























Executive   Civil Service   Parliament   Private Sector   Church   NGOs   Academia   Donors   Foreign   M Me ed di ia a   Others11 
 
Figure 7:  Anticipated Basecase Outcome of Timor-Leste’s Civil Service Reform Agenda 
 
 
Defining and interpreting alternative scenarios. Scenario analysis suggested that the Bank could 
help tighten consensus around a somewhat more comprehensive and strategically articulated level of 
reform—including a legal basis for civil service management, moving toward reform 
implementation—if it were to devote more attention and resources to this issue. Conversely, if the 
Bank were to pull back from this issue, the model suggested that consensus would also tighten, but 
at a lower and more piecemeal level of reform—outlining only the framework for civil service 
management. Scenario analysis indicated that governance-focused NGOs could credibly pressure 
key civil service groups—including teachers, health workers, police, and district staff—to press for 
full reform; however, the ABSM also suggested that this could fracture consensus and possibly ignite 
political conflict if the urgency of reform demands were high. The team tested several other 
strategies, but none was sufficient to drive reforms beyond the formalistic steps foreseen in the 
basecase.  
 
What did we learn? The analytical findings advanced PREM and country management discussions 
about the possibility of marshaling the Bank’s resources in support of lower but more feasible levels 
of reform or concentrating on more specific elements of the administrative reform agenda. ABSM 
framing and analysis sharpened the country team’s view that governance reforms often take shape as 
a three-stage process in Timor-Leste. Moving from the existing situation—characterized by multiple, 
ad hoc, and often disconnected civil service systems—to creating formal institutional arrangements 
would not be that difficult. But progress would likely be stymied in the leap between laying out those 
arrangements and their actual implementation. In addition, the stakeholder analysis challenged the 
presumption, common among the Bank and other donors, that government policy is indeed 
amenable to successful intervention. The exercise emphasized, on the contrary, that development 
partners may have relatively little influence on the current civil service reform agenda, and that 
positions we might take could have unintended effects like fracturing coalitions and even triggering 
policy retrogression. Nevertheless, in a country where the reform debate is still evolving, the process 
of specifying the reform issue and conducting interviews with key players can actually shape the 
nature and content of that debate. 
 































Informing Analytical Work: Input to the Mongolia Mining Sector CGAC 
 
As Mongolia’s new democracy and market economy mature, Mongolian society is increasingly 
concerned about corruption and weak governance. As a significant source of revenue, the mining 
sector is particularly susceptible to rent seeking and corruption; in a recent survey, Mongolian 
citizens ranked mining as the second-most corrupt sector, after land utilization.
14 The government 
has made important strides toward improving transparency and accountability in the sector, 
including its ongoing effort to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
Still, problems persist in ensuring transparency and efficiency in the production and management of 
mineral resources. In particular, the current system for granting mining licenses is ad hoc, 
discretionary, and under-regulated, and manual processing opens the door to manipulation and 
corruption in the issuance of mining permits.  
 
Such concerns were part of the focus of a Country Governance and Anticorruption (CGAC) 
Assessment conducted in 2007 as part of a Bank-wide initiative for which Mongolia was a pilot 
country. The Mongolia CGAC undertook broad governance analysis to inform the Country 
Partnership Strategy. A problem-driven political economy framework was used to identify a series of 
potential reform steps across various elements of the natural resource value chain, including mining 
licensing, public financial management, public investment planning and procurement, and social 
transfer policies. These findings provided a springboard to help mainstream the Bank-wide 
governance and anti-corruption (GAC) agenda and methodology in the sectors, and the CGAC team 
worked closely with country management, technical and sector colleagues, and Mongolian 
stakeholders to identify the key measures needed to achieve “good enough” governance in the 
mining sector. As part of this initiative, the country team employed the ABSM to help assess the 
prospects for improving sector governance to make effective use of growing mining revenues. With 
national parliamentary elections slated for the following month and mining sector issues at the top 
of the political agenda, this pilot of the ABSM was conducted at a pivotal time. Among other issues 
related to transparency and accountability, the ABSM analysis focused on reform of the mining 
licensing and cadastre systems. Following is a brief review of the analysis on this issue. 
 
Framing the question. The issue of mining transparency in Mongolia encompassed procedures for 
awarding mining exploration licenses, including the degree to which these procedures are 
transparent, as well as the maintenance and public availability of cadastre records. License 
application and allocation procedures are highly complex and opaque, making it difficult for 
Mongolian citizens to learn about, evaluate, and challenge ongoing and proposed mining activities. 
There are some 29 steps in the application process and the cadastre system is not computerized. The 
resulting delays have tarnished the reputation of the cadastre office, as has the perceived role of 
patronage and favoritism in determining license awards. In response, the cadastre office has begun 
developing procedures and manuals to reduce the informality and discretion of license granting 
procedures and to streamline the number of necessary steps. The parliament holds authority over 
broader mining policy decisions, raising questions as to whether politicians and government officials 
will initiate changes that limit their power in the sector. The ABSM was applied to help gauge the 
level of political commitment for reform in this area, including improved regulation, information 
dissemination, and computerization of cadastre records. 
 
                                                 
14 Asia Foundation and United States Agency for International Development (2008) Mongolia Corruption Benchmarking 
Survey 2006-2008. 13 
 
Specifying the issue. The policy continuum for the mining transparency issue included a series of 
cumulative steps (Figure 8), building from the current ad hoc, discretionary, under-regulated, and 
politicized process for granting mining licenses (0) to the implementation of a clear legal framework 
and automated cadastre system, complete with internet-based query capabilities (100). In between, 
preliminary measures included decreasing the number of steps in the application process, supporting 
a cadastre website, and clarifying the status of land. The next stage of reform involved enacting 
increasingly stringent exploration requirements for license holders, rolling out the automated 
cadastre system, and holding public consultations on mining costs and benefits. The final stage of 
reform included establishing an interagency commission to oversee and ratify cadastre 
recommendations, fully deploying the automated cadastre system, and applying a clear regulatory 
framework for granting and renewing exploration licenses.   
 


























Collecting data. The team discussed mining issues with about a dozen experts in government, 
parliament, civil society, mining companies, and donor organizations, including within the Bank. 
Although these experts were broadly willing to talk openly about mining issues, many of them had 
only superficial information on the specifics of mining license and cadastre system reforms; access to 
those on the inside of the reform debate was constrained due to the pre-election timing.  
 
The data showed that, at the time of the pilot exercise, stakeholder positions varied widely across the 
spectrum of possible reforms (Figure 9). Many executive stakeholders and political parties supported 
mid-level reforms such as granting mining leases only after economic feasibility is established, 
deploying an automated cadastre system even if not fully operational, and supporting public 
0 – Ad hoc, discretionary, under-regulated, and politicized process for 
granting mining licenses  
10 – Streamlining begun by decreasing the number of process steps through 
detailed operational procedures 
20 – Status of land clarified via Ministry of Nature & Environment for 
reserves, protected areas, and special use lands 
30 – Minimum expenditure required on exploration licenses to minimize 
speculation; automated system partially deployed, with only geodetic data 
40 – Provisions in place for exploration continuation until economic 
viability is established 
50 – Mining leases granted only when economic feasibility is established; 
automated cadastre system deployed but not fully operational 
65 – Public consultation supported on mining costs and benefits as part of 
license granting process 
70 – Interagency commission established to oversee & ratify cadastre 
recommendations; automated system deployed; quarterly reports published 
87 – Clear regulatory framework applied, with publicly disclosed regulations 
above the ministerial level, preferably through cabinet or presidential decree 
100 – Regulatory framework applied in granting & renewing licenses; 
automated mining cadastre system fully developed, with web query enabled 
15 – Computerized cadastre and license records website supported14 
 
consultation on mining costs and benefits. A few members of the executive—including the Prime 
Minister, Anticorruption Agency, National Audit Office, the head of the Mineral Resources and 
Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (MRPAM), and the director of the cadastre office—advocated 
more comprehensive reform, including the establishment of an interagency commission to oversee 
and ratify cadastre recommendations and the full deployment of an automated cadastre system with 
quarterly reports published. Cadastre office staff preferred to limit reforms to providing for 
exploration continuation while economic viability was being established. Mining sector 
representatives were split between opposing reform and supporting the application of a clear 
regulatory framework, depending on their position in the current system. Among those supporting 
only cosmetic initiatives were provincial governors and Erdenet, a state-run mining joint venture 
with Russia. The Bank’s sector experts on mining and public sector reform advocated the 
application of a clear legal framework with publicly disclosed regulations. The Bank’s country 
management team supported slightly more modest reform, closer to the establishment of an 
interagency commission and deployment of an automated cadastre system. 
 




Analyzing the basecase. Based on initial stakeholder positions and perceptions, the model’s results 
indicated that—despite the push for a better mining licensing regime supported by the director and 
staff of the cadastre office—no concrete agreement would be reached (Figure 10). Instead, the 
model anticipated that two countervailing coalitions would form. The pro-reform coalition would 
come together in support of establishing an interagency commission to oversee and ratify cadastre 
recommendations, including the Prime Minister and his supporters within the Mongolian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the Democrats’ Polar Star faction, the Ministry of Finance, the head of 
MRPAM, the Mongolian National Mining Association, parliamentary committees and some foreign 
mining companies. The less reformist coalition would only support the steps leading up to, and 
including, the granting of mining leases only after economic feasibility is established. Led by the 
President, this block would garner strong support from the President’s supporters within MPRP, 
MRPAM staff, and an influential Mongolian energy sector consulting company. A few groups—
including governors in resource-rich provinces, the regional treasury, the Ministry of Energy and 
Fuels, the Republican party, and some private companies—were shown to have significant leverage 
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Defining and interpreting alternative scenarios. ABSM scenario analysis was used to explore 
several options to build consensus on mining transparency reforms. If the Bank were to make this 
issue a top priority, the model did not foresee that there would be any improvement in consensus; in 
fact, this move would be expected to cement support for only mid-level reforms. By making this 
issue a top priority and moderating its position to support the granting of mining licenses only when 
economic feasibility could be established, the Bank could help foster some consensus for slightly 
higher-level reforms—including public consultation on mining costs and benefits and the 
establishment of an interagency commission. On balance, though, this strategy was expected to have 
little beneficial impact, as the countervailing coalitions would become even more polarized. Scenario 
analysis also explored the possibility that the director of the cadastre office could sway his staff, 
provincial governors, and the regional treasury to back the creation of an interagency commission. 
While the model suggested that this tactic would galvanize some agreement on this step, it would 
not be expected to overcome the opposition of domestic political parties.  
 
What did we learn? This pilot of the ABSM was informed by several background notes on key 
reform issues, produced in the context of the Mongolia CGAC. This analytical preparation was of 
considerable use in providing the contextual and informational basis for the stakeholder analysis—it 
laid out broad hypotheses about the potential political space for reform, identified key stakeholders, 
and suggested potential entry points for the Bank’s engagement in the policy process. The ABSM 
was used, in turn, to assess the degree of political commitment around those potential interventions 
in an operationally timely window as parties crystallized their platforms. Reflecting the highly 
politicized nature of the mining transparency issue, particularly given political polarization in the 
month before national elections, the analysis cautioned that there was little the Bank could do to 
effect sustained reform in this area at the time. This experience suggested that the relevance and 
utility of the ABSM could be enhanced if modeling capabilities were embedded within the country 
management unit, allowing for flexible and timely responses to rapidly shifting operational 
environments and priorities.  
 
Facilitating Project Implementation: Guidance and Risk Mitigation for the Philippines 
NPSTAR 
 
Tax administration reform has been a major governance challenge in the Philippines for over two 
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in 1997. The 1986 reforms aimed to simplify collection systems and succeeded in boosting revenues. 
The later initiative attempted to bridge the revenue gap expected in the wake of economic 
liberalization; but it came to fruition during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and weak political 
commitment led to a failure to produce results. The Bank’s own support to the sector has had an 
equally mixed record. The Tax Computerization Project of the mid-1990s achieved some important 
technical gains but reform impact foundered in the face of administrative obstacles and political 
opposition to implementation. 
 
The government’s more recent, small-scale reform programs have fared better. The passage of a 
value added tax reform law in 2005 sparked a 20% increase in tax collections. Other wins have been 
achieved through compliance verification drives, third-party information gathering, expanded tax 
audits, and lifestyle checks on public employees. Large gains in tax collection have remained elusive, 
however. The ratio of tax revenue to GDP has begun to rise, but remains low relative to other East 
Asian countries. Out of a workforce of about 33 million, only 6 million taxpayers are registered. An 
aging information system has created a logjam, leaving tens of thousands of tax returns unprocessed. 
This backlog, together with extensive tax exemptions for well-connected individuals, does little to 
encourage workers to register. Despite the government’s formal commitment to address these 
problems, systematic reforms that would make a real and sustainable impact on tax revenues 
consistently lack traction. This lack of movement on reforms points to deeper political obstacles. 
 
Building on continuing dialogue between the Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
government, the Bank introduced a new tax administration reform operation in mid-2007. The 
multi-donor National Program Support for Tax Administration Reform (NPSTAR) seeks to achieve 
quick wins in its early phases, creating demonstration effects to build momentum for broader 
reforms down the line. The program’s four components include tax compliance, enforcement and 
control, human resource development and management, and Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) 
governance and change management. In an effort to avoid the pitfalls of earlier reform efforts, the 
Bank applied ABSM to help understand the potential political obstacles to successful 
implementation of the NPSTAR and to formulate a risk mitigation strategy. The Philippines pilot 
analyzed four separate issues on three broad fronts: (1) the macro-political landscape for general tax 
reform; (2) the micro-issues surrounding BIR internal organization, including full enforcement of 
the Lateral Attrition Law—which was designed to provide incentives for BIR and customs staff to 
exceed revenue targets—and implementation of performance management systems; and (3) the 
micro-issue of increasing BIR tax collection capacity through taxpayer registration. Following is a 
brief review of the model’s analysis of the taxpayer registration issue. 
 
Framing the question. The absence of accountable, fair, and clean taxpayer registration processes 
reinforces the population’s negative attitudes toward the tax system, as does the backlog of returns. 
Expanding taxpayer registration appeared to be the most politically feasible tax reform issue on the 
table in the Philippines, but two key areas presented problems: computerization and access to the 
tax information base. At the time of the analysis, only 48 of the 112 district offices were 
computerized, making it difficult to keep track of taxpayers and handle delinquencies.
15 The option 
of outsourcing registration in the short term had been raised, but there were concerns regarding 
confidentiality of taxpayer records. Registration improvements could also be complicated by 
                                                 
15 Rodolfo Vicerra, Director General, Congressional Planning and Budget Department, Philippines House of Representatives (2005) 
“The Looming Fiscal Crisis Shouldn’t Be that Taxing.” Manila, Philippines. 17 
 
opposition from corrupt officials who were unwilling to support reforms that might diminish their 
rent-seeking opportunities as well as by key stakeholders who had not prioritized the issue.  
 
Specifying the issue. The country team identified three main stages of taxpayer registration reform 
(Figure 11), building cumulatively from keeping the current system (0) to full taxpayer registration 
(80) to contracting out the registration process (100). Intermediate policy steps focused on 
expanding registration objectives, arranged in order of increasing political difficulty: reviewing 
content requirements and registration procedures; prioritizing classification categories; agreeing on 
procedures to clean the database by removing stop filers; agreeing on tax mapping objectives, 
approach, and methodology; and moving from internally-staffed full registration implemented at a 
gradual pace to full registration through external contracting, done quickly.  
 














Collecting data. Interviews were conducted with over thirty experts on tax reform in the 
Philippines, including representatives from the government, civil society, the private sector, 
academia, and donor organizations. The data showed that most stakeholders supported considerable 
movement toward taxpayer registration reform (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12:  Initial Stakeholder Positions on Taxpayer Registration in the Philippines 






























0 – Do nothing 
25 – Content requirements & registration procedures reviewed
45 – Priorities set for registration by classification (e.g. large taxpayers first)
60 – Procedures agreed to clean & validate database & remove stop filers 
70 – Objectives, approach, and methodology for tax mapping agreed 
80 – Full registration rolled out slowly, without contracting out 
90 – BIR registration contracted out, with Commissioner’s support 
100 – Full registration contracted out quickly18 
 
Executive stakeholders, including the President and Department of Finance (DOF), favored full 
registration as long as it was not contracted out. The BIR Commissioner advocated the definition of 
objectives, approach, and methodology for tax mapping, while BIR staff and Revenue District 
Offices (RDOs) were only open to reviewing content requirements and registration procedures. 
Anti-reform camps in the House and Senate were willing to support prioritization of classification 
categories. The Bank advocated contracting out BIR registration, which was a controversial position 
given the requirements for confidentiality in handling taxpayer records.  
 
Analyzing the basecase. Based on these initial stakeholder positions and perceptions, ABSM 
analysis suggested that there would be tentative agreement on defining the objectives, approach, and 
methodology for tax mapping, but actual implementation was expected to encounter serious 
difficulties (Figure 13). Specifically, BIR examiners, RDO clerks, and other reform opponents would 
stand firm in advocating only the review of content requirements and registration procedures. These 
groups could unravel any reforms mandated by BIR management by swaying Congressional 
reformers, donors, and the private sector to take less forceful reformist positions. 
 
Figure 13:  Anticipated Basecase Outcome of Taxpayer Registration in the Philippines 
 
 
Defining and interpreting alternative scenarios. ABSM scenario analysis explored several 
possible strategies for mitigating the program implementation risks posed by the strong political 
opposition predicted by the model. If the Bank were to take a softer stance—advocating full 
registration but not pushing for it to be contracted out—stakeholders would still be expected to 
come together only on defining the objectives, approach, and methodology for tax mapping but the 
implementation problems foreseen in the basecase would likely ease. A more promising approach 
would be for the Bank to express its dual positions, with country management pressing for full 
registration—contracted out and carried out quickly—and PREM settling for agreement on the 
parameters for tax mapping (Figure 14). If PREM were then to approach the BIR Management 
Committee to support full taxpayer registration conducted internally, this would be expected to 
prompt strong agreement on establishing at least the parameters for tax mapping with mid- to long-
term political support for full registration by government. Opposition from BIR examiners, RDOs, 
local governments, and anti-reform elements in Congress would dissipate, although extended 
discussions would probably be required to settle on the exact level of reform. 































Figure 14: Scenario Analysis – Dual Bank Positions on Taxpayer Registration in the Philippines 
 
 
What did we learn? The model’s results made intuitive sense to members of the NPSTAR project 
team; they were aware that these reforms could provoke resistance but the analysis helped them 
think through these issues more systematically. Based on ABSM results, the project team gained a 
deeper understanding of the precise sources of resistance and ideas for how the project approach 
could be adjusted accordingly. In particular, the entrenched opposition from BIR staff suggested the 
need for more attention to change management within the agency and participatory activities to 
empower lower-level staff. In response, the project devoted a greater proportion of its resources to 
change management activities, including information dissemination campaigns and workshops to 
increase understanding of the reform process, and surveys to solicit feedback.  
 
Piloting the ABSM helped the country team unpack the sources and strength of political opposition 
to tax reform in the Philippines. It became clear that most stakeholders wanted reform, but 
wholesale progress was being thwarted by a smaller group of powerful, interested stakeholders. The 
analysis of the overall tax reform landscape indicated that revamping the entire system would not be 
feasible at this time. But the model also identified opportunities to achieve tangible progress through 
more targeted attention on key micro-level issues, several of which corresponded with components 
of the NPSTAR. These findings validated the program’s approach of starting small to build 
momentum for future reforms. Indeed, this strategy was borne out by the results of the taxpayer 
registration analysis, where building consensus on lower-level reforms was expected to lay the 
foundation for more meaningful change later on. Even small changes in the Bank’s position could 
help cement this needed consensus. 
 
 
IV—Key Insights from the ABSM Pilot 
 
The EAP multi-country pilot of agent-based stakeholder modeling has demonstrated the potential 
utility of mainstreaming this type of political analysis throughout the Bank’s work, at various stages 
of the operational cycle depending on country team demand and the country environment.  
 
 































The Evaluation Framework 
 
As part of the pilot exercise, a standardized assessment tool was developed to evaluate the process 
of applying and adapting the ABSM to country governance reforms as well as the model’s impact on 
country team decision-making. In focusing on the process, the evaluation framework aimed to get a 
sense of how the ABSM affected the way the country team approached a particular governance 
problem—what their expectations were at the outset, how the experience of systematic data 
collection and analysis shaped their views, and what effect, if any, the results had on their approach 
to the issue on the ground. The evaluation tool also focused on results, seeking to determine 
whether the ABSM improved the quality of political analysis underpinning Bank programming 
decisions. To this end, the framework’s questions (excerpted in Table 3) sought to examine whether 
the model’s recommendations were adopted and whether reform outcomes were as expected.  
 
Table 3:  ABSM Evaluation Framework 
 
Ex ante expectations  ABSM analysis and 
recommendations  Immediate outcomes  Impact over time 
What is the Bank’s desired 
level of reform? 
What new insights and/or 
relationships did ABSM 
reveal? 
Did the Bank redefine its 
desired level of reform? 
Did the altered strategy 
affect the reform outcome?
Who are the key 
stakeholders and what are 
their relationships? 
Did ABSM change your 
views about the behavior 
of key stakeholders or the 
nature/difficulty of the 
reform issue? 
How did ABSM alter 
relations with client or 
other stakeholders? 
Did the altered strategy 
achieve its objectives? 
What should the Bank’s 
strategy be? What are the 
advantages and 
disadvantages of this 
strategy? 
Did the strategy change?  Did you try any strategies 
that emerged from ABSM 
analysis? What were your 
expectations for this 
strategy? 
What would have 
happened if the Bank had 
not changed its approach? 
How do you intend to use 
ABSM? 
For which issues and 
operational stages is ABSM 
most useful? 
If you did not change the 
strategy, why not? 
What is the marginal 
benefit of ABSM over 
time? 
 
The ABSM evaluation was conducted as a set of ex ante and ex post interviews of each analytical team 
involved in the pilot. These country team evaluations revealed useful insights drawn from each stage 
of the model’s application—from thinking through the key elements of each reform issue and the 
relationships among stakeholders to testing some of the model’s more promising strategic 
recommendations. Table 4 provides a brief summary of key evaluation insights on four of the five 
applications of ABSM in the East Asia and Pacific Region.  
 
In many of the multiple issues examined in each case, high initial expectations of reform progress 
were shown to be unrealistic in the face of strong opposition, often from expected quarters. In this 
respect, neither a broad civil service reform agenda in Timor-Leste nor the more targeted sequence 
of mining license reforms proposed in Mongolia appeared to have the necessary political traction on 
the ground for implementation.  
 
In other cases, the ABSM yielded granular insights on sources of support for reform where the 
Bank’s initial expectations were originally more pessimistic. In the case of taxpayer reforms in the 21 
 
Philippines, for example, the country team’s expectations were low at the outset due to the failure of 
previous reform efforts to gain traction. The Bank had tried to influence major opposition groups, 
such as large taxpayers and anti-reform elements in Congress, through dialogue, but to no avail. 
Through ABSM analysis, the team was surprised to find that a small group of previously overlooked 
stakeholders—the tax examiners working in the Bureau of Internal Revenue—would likely block 
reforms otherwise supported by the majority of stakeholders. This insight prompted the team to 
shift tactics, introducing into the NPSTAR program a more aggressive change management strategy 
aimed at helping tax examiners and other lower-level staff understand the potential benefits to be 
gained from improved taxpayer registration and broader tax administration reform.  
 
Other cases demonstrated that shifts in the Bank’s own positioning on reforms might yield better-
than-expected results. In two cases, reflecting variance in internal views and expressing diverse Bank 
positions on reform led to a tightening of stakeholder consensus at a higher level of reform than 
initially anticipated. In one case, working toward a more moderate goal with greater inclusiveness 
yielded better-than-expected results, since key stakeholders for whom the reforms had high salience 
could drive progress. Maintaining a focus on tangible micro-reforms held the key to realizing limited 
but meaningful objectives in an otherwise stalled macro-reform environment. 
 






ABSM analysis and 
recommendations 
Immediate 




 Pre-election timing 
considered a window 
of opportunity for 
transparency reforms 
 Powerful officials 
strongly opposed 
greater public access 
to budgets 
 Opportunities for 
Bank to work with 
civil society to push 
for reform 
 Bank made an effort 
to engage in 
meaningful 
consultations; 
increased emphasis on 
demand-side in 
country program 
 Insights supported 
by CGAC political 
economy analysis 
 Achieved reform 
level Bank team was 
aiming for: better than 
basecase, but short of 





 Pre-election timing 
considered a window 
of opportunity for 
transparency reforms 
 No concrete 
agreement expected, 
despite support of key 
counterparts 
 “Wait and see” 
approach 
 Team may reapply 





 Difficult project 
implementation due 
to disagreement over 
design and failure of 
past reform efforts 
 One overlooked 
group of stakeholders 
(tax examiners) could 
block implementation 
 Revise project 
approach 
 Bank introduced 
change management 
into project design; 
slightly adjusted 
timeline 
 Project still in early 
implementation phase 






 Window of 
opportunity on civil 
service reform seen to 
open; Bank still 
forming its strategy  
 Some consensus on 
setting up formal 
architecture of civil 
service management 
 Civil servants could 
splinter consensus if 
mobilized 
 Little role seen for 
the Bank at the time 
 Conduct more 
analytical work while 
awaiting Parliamentary 
action  
 Civil Service 
Commission created 
with expansive scope 
 Little movement on 




A more inclusive strategy resulted from applying the ABSM to budget disclosure reforms in 
Mongolia during the first ABSM pilot in that country. The team’s initial approach was to work 
directly with key government counterparts to encourage greater transparency in the budget process. 
Reform expectations were high, as the dialogue was taking place during an election year and it was 
thought that this would encourage key stakeholders to support transparency and participation. In 
conducting stakeholder interviews, the team was surprised to find that stakeholder opinions varied 
more widely than initially thought. Moreover, ABSM analysis indicated that the Bank had relatively 
little influence over the Ministry of Finance on this issue. Instead, non-governmental organizations 
like the Open Society Institute were shown to have a great deal more leverage over government 
counterparts than the team had previously considered. This insight led the Bank team to take on a 
consensus-building role by bringing key stakeholders together around the negotiating table rather 
than working through direct dialogue with traditional government counterparts. Within a year or 
two, the Mongolian government began publishing the executive budget upon submission to the 
National Assembly. This outcome represented a significant improvement over the basecase result 
anticipated by the ABSM in the absence of further interventions. 
 
In this manner, on some issues, insights gleaned through the process and results of ABSM 
application led to adjustments in the Bank’s strategy. This was not the case for all piloted issues, 
however. In some cases, country teams adopted a “wait and see” approach, having determined that 
the political situation was too fluid, the Bank’s understanding of the reform issue too limited, or the 
Bank’s overall strategic goals too underdeveloped to proceed on the basis of ABSM results. In the 
second Mongolia pilot, for example, data collection efforts were constrained by the pre-election 
timing of the analysis such that the team did not feel it had achieved a sufficient grasp on the 
stakeholder landscape to move forward on sensitive mining sector reforms. In Timor-Leste, 
applying the ABSM to macro civil service reform issues proved to be complicated by a limited 
understanding of the appropriate sequencing of reforms in that context. The Bank elected to wait 
until the Parliament had taken some action in the direction of civil service reform before making 
further decisions, and to conduct additional analytical work in the meantime. While this outcome 
may not have differed from what would have occurred without ABSM analysis, the decision to delay 
was taken more deliberately following application of the model.  
 
Overall, the ABSM evaluations show that country teams found value in the process of applying the 
model to critical reform issues. Although ABSM results were not considered to reveal definitive 
answers or to substitute for nuanced judgment, pilot teams generally found the model to be a useful 
tool in understanding the political economy of reforms and testing new approaches to complex 
reform issues. The analytical methodology crystallized the trade-offs among various dimensions of 
reform and the possible benefits to be gained from sacrificing some movement in the degree of 
reform in favor of reaching greater consensus, or in slowing down the speed of reform in order to 
achieve better results. Teams that tested ABSM-recommended strategies generally found them to 
make intuitive sense and yield useful results.   
 
The Value of the ABSM Logic 
 
In addition, the methodology underlying the application of ABSM and its structured format forced 
teams to think critically about the nature and sequencing of reform issues and comprehensively 
about the stakeholder landscape. Hence the process of applying the ABSM can itself be instructive. 
Framing, issue specification, and scenario analysis are beneficial even just in terms of the 
conversations they foster among the team as they think through problems and options more 23 
 
systematically. The process of collecting data is also illuminating, as it encourages field staff to 
engage in structured conversations with their counterparts on specific issues and to rethink their 
assumptions about how politics affect the Bank’s work. Implementing the ABSM gives shape and 
discipline to political analysis in the Bank, which can be helpful in an environment of heavy 
workloads and competing priorities. Although political analysis has come to be regarded as an 
important input to strategy development and program design, the absence of a standardized, 
mainstream mechanism for applying such analysis in an operationally useful way has blocked its full 
integration into the decision-making process. The ABSM can help make the application of political 
analysis more robust and the process of collecting data on stakeholder preferences can help get the 
ball rolling on better understanding of the political dynamics of reform.  
 
Framing the question. The first stage of ABSM analysis can help Bank teams articulate the overall 
aim of their interventions and how they fit into the broader political context. The organizational 
logic of the model’s approach and its visual representation in the ABSM software can help guide 
strategy discussions and define the parameters of program design and implementation. Often, the 
process of framing and specifying potential issues for analysis can bring knowledge gaps to light.  
 
Specifying the issue. A number of substantive challenges are inherent in issue specification, often 
pushing Bank staff to think much more carefully about the steps along the critical path in a given 
reform program than would normally be required in preparing a support package or even a piece of 
analytic work. The process of issue specification can thus facilitate a productive discussion about the 
sequencing and comparative difficulty of a set of reforms on a given issue. For example, for an issue 
continuum to be linear, all stakeholders must order the various steps along the continuum in the 
same manner. For issues that are continuous and directional by nature, this is not a problem. It is 
much more challenging to lay out a linear continuum for issues that are made up of discrete reform 
“steps”—all stakeholders may not view the various reform steps in the same order of political 
difficulty or even see them as moving along a single reform track. For complex, multi-pronged 
reform programs, the analytical contortions required to specify a linear continuum may not be worth 
the analytical payoff. Decisions about the level of disaggregation in specifying the continuum must 
be viewed as a balance between modeling what is necessary to understand the reform process for 
better-informed decision-making versus recreating a high-fidelity model of the actual problem. 
 
Collecting data. The quality of the data determines the quality of the analysis: if garbage goes in, 
garbage comes out. The process of data collection through expert interviews has neither the luxury 
of statistical safeguards built into large-sample data analysis, nor the exhaustive nature of good 
qualitative research methods. Analysts using the ABSM must take care to ensure that data collected 
through expert interviews are accurate and representative of reality. Choices about a data collection 
strategy will vary across countries depending on the political economy context, and on the specific 
issues to be analyzed. There are two major dimensions guiding this choice (Figure 15): (1) the difficulty 
of the reform environment, including the Bank’s relationship with the government, overall government 
effectiveness in achieving reforms, and the level of divisiveness in society as a whole; and (2) access to 
good and relevant data, which depends on factors such as the degree of openness in society, the Bank’s 
access to non-governmental experts, and the number of experts who understand the country and the 
specific reforms being analyzed.
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16 In low capacity environments, data quality may also depend on the Bank’s ability to conduct interviews in a way that 
encourages local experts to apply their considerable local knowledge to the technical issues being explored. 24 
 




Data quality can be strengthened in various ways. First, an effort should be made to interview as 
many genuine issue experts as possible. One some issues, such as civil service reform in Timor-Leste 
or mining transparency in Mongolia, this number may actually be quite small given the breadth and 
depth of technical and political knowledge required. In other cases, as in macro tax reforms in the 
Philippines, the team can take advantage of the wide variety of experts with useful knowledge and 
varying viewpoints on the issue to increase confidence in the data. Second, during data collection, 
analysts continually perform internal consistency checks on the information provided by experts 
through careful, pair-wise comparisons of the numerical values assigned to position, influence, and 
salience for the stakeholders involved. Third, if analysts are uncertain about any particular piece of 
data, a sensitivity test can be carried out to changes in that piece of data. Finally, with each 
successive use of the ABSM in a given country, the Bank builds a library of data. Continued use of 
the ABSM software can compile useful information for tracking patterns over time and sharing 
knowledge, both within the country team and across the Bank.   
 
Analyzing the basecase and testing scenarios. The ABSM offers a wide-ranging menu of 
analytical options through its software package. Systematic interpretation of results and creative 
scenario analysis are facilitated by the software’s use of a SWOT framework, in which analysts are 
encouraged to think through and record the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats 
associated with the basecase result and each alternative scenario. To help identify strengths and 
weaknesses, the team begins with a careful and detailed examination of the model’s results. Is there 25 
 
convergence on a specific reform position? If so, at what level? Who are the outliers, and are they 
strong enough to stall reforms? Where are the Bank’s allies? Next, the team drills down into the 
details of the model’s bargaining dynamics to better understand potential opportunities and threats. 
Which stakeholders are moving to what positions, and in response to whom? Can the Bank 
convince other stakeholders to support more reform? What leverage do other stakeholders have to 
push for a lower level of reform than the Bank is advocating? The model’s scenario analysis 
capabilities then allow analysts to explore scenarios in which the above opportunities and threats are 
exercised and thereby anticipate how outcomes might change. The Bank can also test its own role in 
the reform process, adjusting its position or level of commitment (salience) to determine whether 
these changes could help nudge the reform agenda forward or bring additional stakeholders on 
board. In essence, the ABSM can lay out strategic choices in a way that helps country and project 
teams think through the political opportunities and consequences inherent in their programming 
decisions.  
 
The ABSM’s Operational Value for the Bank 
 
As part of the pilot exercise, the ABSM has been used to think through various political and reform 
puzzles facing the Bank and its country clients and to provide real-time analytical inputs to 
programming decisions, often under intense time pressure. Through this pilot experience, the team 
has refined the process of applying the model’s analytical approach to Bank work and illuminated 
possible ways to integrate the ABSM into the Bank’s regular programming decisions. Here, we 
highlight the ABSM’s major analytical benefits. 
 
Modeling a complex, multi-stakeholder reality. The capacity to model complex problems allows 
the ABSM to capture intricate interactions among a large number of stakeholders. Traditional, 
qualitative stakeholder tools cannot achieve this, rendering their explanatory power largely intuitive. 
Assuming good data are fed into the model, the ABSM is likely to provide a more robust and 
comprehensive picture of the political forces that affect reform. Moreover, the flexibility to change 
the menu of stakeholders, alter their positions, and test varying scenarios allows the tool to more 
closely model policy-making conditions in the real world. This dynamic quality, accompanied by 
accessible and intuitive graphical simulations in the accompanying  software, makes the ABSM 
particularly useful in sifting through intricate political realities to help zero in on more feasible 
reform strategies. 
 
Illuminating macro-micro political relationships. The ABSM  is a micro-political tool that 
captures finely grained details a more macro-political analysis cannot. There are both advantages and 
drawbacks to this. The ABSM can elucidate the micro-political relationships among stakeholders 
that can be so central to reform processes and outcomes, although it is less able to embed these 
bargaining dynamics in the overall macro-political context. Still, where macro-level reforms have 
stalled, drilling down to examine stakeholder positions and the influence they exert on each other on 
a specific sub-issue can reveal new insights about the opportunities and threats facing reforms, 
which are hard to see from a more aerial macro-political perspective. In the Philippines and Timor-
Leste, this capability helped the country team clarify the Bank’s comparative advantage in supporting 
micro-reforms within a macro-political agenda that appeared stalled. Over time, collecting data on 
where stakeholders stand on these micro issues can help track patterns in the broader landscape of 
political relationships.  
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Testing and challenging conventional wisdom. The ABSM tests prevailing assumptions about a 
political or reform context. By formalizing the data collection process through interviews with 
experts, the ABSM can assess the degree of consensus on the generally accepted view of reform. In 
a political environment where the conventional wisdom has been quite static over time, i.e., where 
no new political dynamics have been revealed, the model can dig down into individual perceptions 
of issue-specific reform possibilities to reveal new insights that are not readily apparent through 
casual—or even close—observation. In gathering information from Bank and donor staff and core 
government counterparts, the analyst can gauge whether each individual’s on-the-ground 
experiences reinforce or challenge the conventional wisdom about relationships among stakeholders; 
their relative positions, influence, and salience; and reform processes and outcomes. Without such a 
check, there is a danger that donors are reinforcing conventional wisdom in a circular process 
amongst themselves without testing whether it is representative of reality. In the Timor-Leste pilot, 
for example, the analysis of the proposed Civil Service Commission’s mandate pointed out that a 
few key stakeholders who were originally thought to be relatively powerless instead held quite a bit 
of potential sway over the outcome of reform.  
 
Breaking into the black box of “political will.” Another advantage of the ABSM is that it 
disaggregates down to individual stakeholders the concept of political will and thereby breaks into 
this ubiquitous “black box” of donor speak. Using the ABSM’s data and analytical tools, the Bank 
can potentially understand much more deeply the relationships among stakeholders that can either 
fuel or dampen reform progress, thus unveiling the contours and substance of political will. This 
knowledge can help to identify politically motivated factors that could improve impact or pave the 
way for greater reform consensus down the road. In the Philippines, after years of stalled initiatives, 
the NPSTAR team was surprised to learn how much desire there was for tax reform; at the same 
time, a wide array of pro-reform groups was unable to overcome the entrenched opposition of a few 
powerful stakeholders. In Mongolia, ABSM interviews and analysis revealed previously unseen splits 
within the major political parties and unexpected coalitions of stakeholders. 
 
Helping to prioritize and sequence reforms. A critical lesson emerging in the Bank’s effort to 
improve the relevance and effectiveness of its development assistance is the need for greater 
selectivity and flexibility in its programs. The ABSM can help tease out the reform initiatives most 
deserving of donor attention and resources by illuminating the degree of political support and 
consensus in a given reform environment. While the Philippines pilot anticipated little tangible 
progress on proposed macro-level reforms, the analysis helped identify micro-level issues where 
there was enough traction to move forward in the meantime. The pilot experience also helped draw 
attention to important “no go” areas, where the Bank might inadvertently squander political capital 
by pushing for something prematurely. In Mongolia, the Bank learned that caution on mining 
transparency issues would be wise in the highly politicized pre-election environment. In the 
Philippines, pressing for implementation of a performance management system was shown to 
harbor the potential for a hostile response among staff who feared its effects on their jobs and 
wages. In Timor-Leste, taking a position on the type of civil service regime was considered 
counterproductive, as the Bank would not be able to help move the debate forward amid entrenched 




Although the ABSM can provide, for the reasons outlined above, a powerful lens through which to 
look at reform possibilities in client countries, it is not a silver bullet. As in any other modeling 27 
 
exercise, there is no way to create a perfect model of reality. There are concerns, for example, that 
the ABSM’s reliance on formal policy positions can distort results by neglecting informal factors 
such as clientelist ties and political tradeoffs across unrelated issues. This potential data bias can be 
addressed by thinking consciously about informal undercurrents when collecting and cross-checking 
data and in interpreting the model’s results. The software’s sensitivity analysis capabilities allow 
analysis teams to run tests on particularly hazy data. Another worry is that the model’s grounding in 
the theory of the median voter will beget the same “race to the center” witnessed in majority-based 
political contests, thereby encouraging only partial reforms. Yet the pilot exercise demonstrated that 
the decision to focus on mid-level reforms to strengthen consensus is a choice that the Bank and its 
counterparts can make in response to the model’s results; it is not by any means a foregone 
conclusion. Teams using the ABSM should remain mindful that it is not a 1:1 model of the world; 





While the need for better political economy analysis to improve on-the-ground results is now 
roundly acknowledged across the World Bank and other development assistance institutions, 
adopting robust approaches that are both rigorous and operationally usable poses a substantial 
challenge. East Asia’s experience with the Agent-Based Stakeholder Model has yielded important 
lessons on the development of “practical political economy” tools.   
 
The country cases showed a continuum of ABSM applications at up-, mid-, and down-stream points 
in the operational cycle, with different policy implications. In Timor-Leste, the analysis was helpful 
in constructing the country and donor policy debate on civil service reform, though the prospects 
for short-term agreement were small; in Mongolia, the analysis helped identify key coalition partners 
and underscored the need for continuing, embedded analysis as electoral and economic conditions 
evolved; and findings in the Philippines underscored the need to tackle smaller reform modules on 
which broad consensus could be achieved, even if this meant scaling back on important reform 
aspirations. In general, the tool was helpful in crafting micro-political policy agreement on specific 
issues, even when the wider reform environment was inhospitable to broad advances. 
 
While the predictive value of the tool was helpful in some instances, it came as something of a 
surprise that the ABSM’s heuristic contribution in helping teams think through the sequence and 
strategies for reform was particularly well received. This suggests that the ABSM would be well-
suited to convening country or sector strategy brainstorming and would be most helpful if carried 
out on a regular, institutionalized basis. The ABSM instrument was distinguished by the systematic, 
just-in-time, and dynamic quality of its analytic power, but the tool did not offer a stand-alone, 
silver-bullet solution and was most effective when complemented by other, broader types of political 
economy analysis. The relative intensity of the field protocol and the need for up-front investment 
in training must be noted as well, but the East Asia experience suggests that these could be 
overcome if the tool were adopted in a high-volume business model. In sum, ABSM offers a 
powerful addition to the political economy toolkit, if utilized thoughtfully. While East Asia’s pilot 
initiative was confined to a limited number of cases, the experience strongly suggests that 
mainstreaming ABSM as a regularly applied analytic instrument could significantly improve the 
operational track record of development institutions such as the World Bank in supporting 
politically realistic reforms in client countries.   
 